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BEYOND BELIEF: 
ON THE USES OF CREEDAL CONFESSION 
Jerome Gellman 
Aquinas took an "expressive view" of creedal confession: (1) Creedal confes-
sions express a person's faith, and (2) Other functions of creedal confession 
are dependent upon this expression of faith. I argue for a purpose of creedal 
confession that is not dependent upon the expressive function, but is non-
expressive all the way down. This purpose depends upon people not mean-
ing what they seem to be saying. To present my case I fist clarify distinctions 
between: belief, acceptance, and treating as true, and distinguish different 
"scopes" of these epistemic attitudes: unrestricted, individual, and group. 
Introduction 
My interest here is with the institution of creedal confessions, public dec-
larations of religious doctrines. Specifically, I am interested in taking issue 
with Aquinas, who recorded a rather common-sense view of the institu-
tion of creedal declaration, in what I will call the "expressive view.// In 
Summa Theologica, in a discussion of creedal confession, Aquinas quotes 2 
Corinthians 4:13, "According as it is written, I believed, and therefore have 
J spoken; we also believe, and therefore speak.// He then comments on this 
verse as follows: 
For the outward utterance is intended to signify the inward thought. 
Wherefore, just as the inward thought of matters of faith is properly 
an act of faith, so too is the outward confession of them. 1 
For Aquinas, then, creedal affirmations are outwardly expressive of what 
exists inwardly: they express a person's faith. For Aquinas, the inward faith 
alone "produces the act of confession without the help of any other vir-
tue.//2 People confess for the very purpose of expressing what they think. 
Now Aquinas does see the institution of creedal confession as also hav-
lng a non-expressive function, namely, not damaging the faith of other 
believers: 
It is not necessary for salvation to confess one's faith at all times and 
in all places, but in certain places and at certain times, when, namely, 
by omitting to do so, we would deprive God of due honor, or our 
neighbor of a service that we ought to render him: for instance, if a 
man on being asked about his faith, were to remain silent, so as to 
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make people believe either that he is without faith, or that the faith 
is false, or as to turn away others from the faith; for in such cases as 
these, confession of faith is necessary for salvation.3 
Here, Aquinas points out the damage that can come from failing to declare 
the creed in contexts where so failing would weaken the faith of others. So 
creedal confession can contribute to sustaining faith. I imagine that Aqui-
nas would also recognize the strengthening of faith as a purpose of creed-
al confession. For him, though, these non-expressive functions supervene 
upon confession's expressive function. Creedal confessions avoid damage 
to the faith and strengthen the faith by way of expressing outwardly what 
exists inwardly in the confessor. So the "expressive" view of creedal con-
fession says that creedal confession expresses a confessor's faith and that 
other purposes of creedal confession depend upon the expressive func-
tion. For Aquinas, then, in the institution of confession people mean what 
they seem to be saying. 
In contrast, I want to point out a function of creedal confession that 
does not go through the expressive function, but is non-expressive all the 
way down to the bottom. It is a function that depends upon people not 
meaning what they seem to be saying. I don't suggest just that this can 
happen or happens, such as when a doubter or heretic insincerely con-
fesses. I mean to advance the idea that this is one of the very purposes of 
the institution of creedal confession, acknowledged or not. 
Belief, Acceptance, and Treating as True4 
My project requires that I begin with the notion of belief and two proposi-
tional attitudes beyond belief: acceptance, and treating as true. In what fol-
lows, I will be expanding these three categories into nine, resulting from 
three different "scopes" for each of the three categories. Philosophers 
including William Alston, L. Jonathan Cohen, Robert Stalnaker, Bas Van 
Fraassen, and Edna Ullman-Margalit and Avishai Margalit, have argued 
for a distinction between belief and acceptance, and some between these 
and treating as true.5 Alas, these philosophers differ over how they char-
acterize the three terms belief, acceptance, and treating as true. For example, 
some take acceptance to be a species of belief, while others take these to be 
exclusive categories. 
My first task here, therefore, will be to fix a terminology for these terms, 
before expanding them in the direction of differing scopes.6 My categories 
are not intended to reflect ordinary usage. Nonetheless, I do wish to cap-
ture some of the flavor of ordinary usage and thereby make the distinc-
tions relevant to our ordinary understanding of belief, and to the nature 
of creedal confession. 
Belief 
Charles Saunders Pierce identified a "feeling of belief," a feeling of convic-
tion that p is true. 7 For someone to have a belief, however, it is not necessary 
that the belief-feeling be occurrent. It suffices that there be a disposition to 
have a belief-feeling in circumstances appropriate to expressing the feeling. 
William Alston has characterized this belief-feeling tendency as follows: 
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(1) If S considers whether p is the case, S will tend to feel it to be the 
case that p. 
Of course, the tendency, as well as the occurrent feeling of conviction, will 
come in degrees. 
Pierce also wrote "Belief does not make us act at once, but puts us into 
such a condition that we shall behave in some certain way, when the oc-
casion arises."8 So there are associated behavioral dispositions. Here is a 
list of the kinds of behavioral dispositions involved, based on Alston, with 
changes and additions of my own:9 
(2) If someone asks S whether p, S will have a tendency to respond in 
the affirmative. 
(3) S will tend to use p as a premise in theoretical and practical reason-
ing where this is appropriate. 
(4) S will tend to act in ways that would be appropriate if it were the 
case that p, given S's goals, aversions, and S's other propositional 
attitudes. III 
(5) S has a tendency, when acting in ways cited by (1)-(4), to act in a 
way that displays S's feeling that pY 
The idea in (5) is that S, for example, not only will tend to affirm p if que-
ried, as (1) says, but will tend to affirm p in a way that reflects S's feeling 
that p. The idea here is that behavior that reflects feeling will have a ten-
dency to be different from behavior that does not. 
Some philosophers, such as L. Jonathan Cohen, place these behavioral 
dispositions outside the concept of belief. I prefer, with most philosophers, 
to include the behavioral dispositions within the concept of belief, so I will 
say that S believes that p when (1)-(5) are true of S. Thus, belief is a dispo-
sitional complex of feeling and behavior. 
Acceptance 
As noted, various philosophers recognize a category beyond belief, that 
they call "acceptance." These philosophers use the term in widely differ-
ing ways, however. My purposes will be served best by adopting some-
thing close to Cohen's and Alston's positions. I will say that S accepts that 
p (implying that S does not believe that p) just in case (1)-(5) are true of S, 
with (1) replaced by: 
If S considers whether p is the case, S will tend to have a positive atti-
tude toward the truth of p, but will not tend to feel that p is true. 
And (5) replaced by 
S has a tendency, when acting in ways cited by (1)-(4), to act in a way 
that does not display a feeling that p. 
Acceptance is like belief, then, except for lacking the dispositions to feel 
and to express the feeling that p is true. Here is an example of acceptance-
formation: A philosopher has pondered arguments for and against the 
existence of God. The arguments in favor of God's existence impress her 
more than those against God's existence, but the former are not strong 
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enough to foster a belief-feeling disposition in her. She deems the argu-
ments for God's existence to be strong enough, however, to adopt this con-
clusion as her philosophical position. So, she makes God's existence her 
position, adopting a positive attitude toward the truth of p, although not 
believing it, that is, without having a feeling of conviction that p is true. 
It is generally accepted that belief cannot be formed by a simple vol-
untary decision, although philosophers might disagree over whether this 
is a contingent or conceptual fact. 12 On the other hand, philosophers take 
acceptance, characterized in various ways, to be voluntary, a matter of de-
ciding to accept, as in the example I just gave of acceptance. Here we must 
be careful, though. We should distinguish between "acceptance" in the 
sense of an act of deciding to accept p, and "acceptance" as a state or condi-
tion described in the version of (1)-(5) for acceptance. Whereas deciding 
to accept p will be voluntary, the state of being in an acceptance-condition 
can come about in an involuntary way. For example, the evidence in favor 
of p might not be potent enough to cause me to believe that p, but strong 
enough to trigger the acceptance behavioral-complex with no decision on 
my part. When I say, then, that acceptance can be either voluntary or in-
voluntary, I mean that one can get into the state or condition of acceptance 
either voluntarily or involuntarily. 
Treating as True 
At this point, I want to distinguish between accepting p and treating p as 
true. The difference is this. Accepting p clashes with thinking p is false or 
doubting p, or having no opinion, since accepting p entails having a posi-
tive attitude toward the truth of p. When I (merely) treat p as true, however, 
either I think p is false or doubt p or have no opinion in the matter. (In ad-
dition, treating as true might involve no more than a temporary conscious 
policy, rather than an implanted tendency. For the sake of simplicity, in 
what follows I will ignore this possibility and focus on tendencies to treat 
as true.) 
Here, now, is a summary of my three categories: 
(A) S believes that p: 
(1) If S considers whether p is the case, S will tend to feel it to be 
the case that p. 
(2) If someone asks S whether p, S will have a tendency to re-
spond in the affirmative. 
(3) S will tend to use p as a premise in theoretical and practical 
reasoning where this is appropriate. 
(4) S will tend to act in ways that would be appropriate if it were 
the case that p, given S's goals, aversions, and other proposi-
tional attitudes. 
(5) S has a tendency, when acting in ways cited by (1)-(4), to act 
in a way that displays S's feeling that p. 
(B) S accepts that p: 
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(1) If S considers whether p is the case, S will tend to have a posi-
tive attitude toward the truth of p, but will not tend to feel that 
p is true. 
(2) If someone asks S whether p, S will have a tendency to re-
spond in the affirmative. 
(3) S will tend to use p as a premise in theoretical and practical 
reasoning where this is appropriate. 
(4) S will tend to act in ways that would be appropriate if it were 
the case that p, given S's goals, aversions, and other proposi-
tional attitudes. 
(5) Shas a tendency, when acting in ways cited by (1)-(4), to act in 
a way that does not display a feeling that p. 
(C) S treats p as true: 
(1) If S considers whether p is the case, S will tend to lack a posi-
tive attitude toward the truth of p (that is, neither believes nor 
accepts p.) 
(2) If someone asks S whether p, S will have a tendency to re-
spond in the affirmative. 
(3) S will tend to use p as a premise in theoretical and practical 
reasoning where this is appropriate. 
(4) S will tend to act in ways that would be appropriate if it were 
the case that p, given S's goals, aversions, and other proposi-
tional attitudes. 
(5) S has a tendency, when acting in ways cited by (1)-(4), to act 
in a way that does not display a feeling that p. 
Treating as true typically occurs with what I shall call "restricted scope," 
existing only within certain kinds of contexts, and not in others. So, for 
example, a salesperson who treats as true the proposition: the customer is 
always right will do so in the restricted context of her job related activity.l3 
We suppose that she does not think the proposition true, but in job related 
contexts will have a tendency to respond positively when the proposition 
is queried (a customer asks when offended, "Don't you think the customer 
is always right?"). She will use the proposition in her job related reasoning 
("Since arguing with this customer would be against the proposition that 
the customer is always right, I will not argue with him."), and so on. Out-
side of such contexts (or when she herself is a customer!) we would expect 
her to have no such tendencies. This leads into my idea of "scopes." 
Individually and Grouply Held Propositional Attitudes 
J want to distinguish between three different scopes for each of my propo-
sitional attitudes: unrestricted, individual, and group. In the former, propo-
sitional tendencies exist with no restrictions to any particular kinds of 
contexts in which the person is found. Individual, and group represent 
two kinds of propositional tendencies having restricted scope. Roughly 
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speaking, when a belief, for example, has an individual scope a person has 
a tendency to have that belief only in contexts in which the individual 
is not, or at least not primarily, thinking of him or her self as part of a 
group. The person then holds the belief "individually," marking the mode 
in which the person has the belief (and not the fact that no relevant other 
person has the same belief).14 In a group scope a person has the tendency 
to have the belief only in contexts wherein he or she is thinking of herself 
as a member of a relevant group. The person then holds the belief grouply, 
that is in a "grouply way."IS The same scope distinction holds for accep-
tance and treating as true. 
To illustrate, consider the following episode from an ethnographic 
study of the Tully River Tribe of Australia made by the ethnographer, 
W. Roth, in 1900.16 Roth reported that Tully River natives believed that a 
woman becomes pregnant by touching a certain kind of frog, by having 
certain dreams, or by eating a certain kind of beans. Roth concluded that 
the Tully River folk had no knowledge of the true biological cause of con-
ception by heterosexual relations. 
This gave rise to the "Tully River Controversy" in anthropology, mainly 
between the American anthropologist, Milford Spiro and the British an-
thropologist, Edmund Leach. Spiro supported Roth's conclusion.17 Ac-
cording to Leach, however, it was wildly implausible to think that these 
natives had not hit upon the biological cause of conception. Thus, Leach 
insists that the tribe-members knew that heterosexual relations caused 
pregnancy. Leach maintains that "When an ethnographer reports that 
'members of the X tribe believe that ... ' he is giving a description of ... 
something which is true of the culture as a whole."ls This means that the 
members of the tribe made their magical claims qua members of their cul-
ture, while holding different individual beliefs. 
Suppose Leach is correct about the Tully River split between grouply 
and individually held positions on magical conception. This could be a 
case of grouply acceptance, formed in an involuntary way through a long 
process of acculturation of the tribes' members. The natives would have 
acquired acceptance-dispositions for magical conception when and only 
when they found themselves thinking grouply. An additional possibility 
is, however, that Tully River natives believed grouply that a woman con-
ceived in a magical way. In their long process of acculturation, they could 
have acquired a disposition for an appropriate belief-feeling and belief-
behavior regarding magical conception when thinking grouply. In group 
contexts, these people would have a tendency to enter a state of mind in 
which they actually felt it to be true that magical pregnancy was true. The 
feeling could have all the Humean "vividness" and "liveliness" that char-
acterizes belief in general. If so, this would be a case of grouply belief It 
seems to me that grouply belief exists, and so I recognize it as a category 
along with group treating as true and group acceptance. 
My distinction between individually and grouply owes much to Mar-
garet Gilbert's distinction between what she calls "individual" and "collec-
tive" belief.19 But there is an important difference. For Gilbert, the belief of 
a person is a collective one only when that person is acting in the capacity 
of a group member or speaking in the name of the group. Gilbert asks us to 
consider the following kind of example: In a committee meeting, opinions 
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differed as to whether a new appropriation was required for higher educa-
tion. By majority vote, the committee decided in favor of the appropriation. 
After the meeting, the committee spokesperson announces to the press that 
"the committee believes" that a new appropriation is required for higher 
education. Consider a member of the committee who voted against this 
decision. Personall~ he believes that a new appropriation is not needed. 
Nonetheless, as a member of the committee he is prepared to advance the 
decision and work for the new legislation. He shares a "collective belief/' 
says Gilbert, that a new appropriation is required. 
Here is how Gilbert contrasts individual and collective belief: 
In the [individual] case, an individual is guided by the proposition 
in question, in his personal reasoning and action. In the [group] case, 
individuals in the role of group members are guided by it as they act 
within the group and as members of the group.20 
And: 
When an individual believes that p, he grants the proposition that 
p the status of an assumption in his own private reasoning. When 
people [as a group] jointly accept that p, they commit themselves 
to granting p the status of an assumption in their public reasoning, 
their discussions, arguments, and conversations with the relevant 
others in the contexts at issue.21 
Now, my category of "grouply" differs from Gilbert's "collective" in 
the following way: I propose to widen the relevant contexts of collective 
propositional attitudes to include not only when a person is in a group 
relevant context, as in public behavior, as Gilbert does, but also when a 
person is simply envisioning himself as a member of the group. This can 
be in the privacy of one's own home as much as at a press conference rep-
resenting a group or in actual group interaction. In addition, I distinguish 
between an unrestricted and an individual scope for the propositional at-
titudes under discussion. 
More carefull~ I offer these definitions: 
(a) S has an individual propositional attitude to p with regard to a group 
G, when the scope of S's attitude to p is restricted to contexts lack-
ing G-group-significance for S. 
(b) S has a grouply propositional attitude to p with regard to a group G, 
when the scope of S's attitude to p is restricted to contexts having 
G-group-significance for S. 
and 
(c) S has an unrestricted propositional attitude to p with regard to a group 
G when S's attitude to p is not restricted in scope, that is, when. S 
has the propositional attitude simpliciter. 
For example, grouply belief would look like this: 
S believes grouply that p relevant to G: 
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(1) If S, in contexts with G-group-significance for S, considers 
whether p is the case, S will in those contexts tend to feel it to 
be the case that p. 
(2) In contexts with G-group-significance for S, if someone asks 
S whether p, S will in those contexts have a tendency to re-
spond in the affirmative. 
(3) In contexts with G-group-significance for S, S will tend to use 
p as a premise in theoretical and practical reasoning where 
this is appropriate. 
(4) In contexts with G-group-significance for S, S will tend to act 
in ways that would be appropriate if it were the case that p, 
given S's goals, aversions, and other propositional attitudes. 
(5) S has a tendency, when acting in ways cited by (1)-(4), to act 
in a way that displays S's feeling that p. 
The intersection of my two groups of categories yields nine epistemic 
categories: 
Belief unrestrictedly, individually, and grouply 
Acceptance: unrestrictedly, individually, and grouply 
Treating as true: unrestrictedly, individually, and grouply 
I assume the possibility of propositional attitudes being cut off from 
each other by exclusive scopes, or of overlapping dispositional sets pos-
sibly at odds with one another, with one set playing a dominant role in 
the overlap. Thus an individual belief might be at odds with a grouply 
acceptance, and so on. 
Some may object to the possibility of "belief" or acceptance being re-
stricted in scope in these ways.22 The grounds for the objection would be 
that something couldn't properly be called "belief" or "acceptance" unless 
it characterized a person's propositional attitude as a whole, as it were. 
Suppose, the objection goes, that in answer to the same query, a person 
would give consecutively contradictory replies. Providing that she under-
stood the question properly, we should conclude that she was irrationat 
confused or perhaps even mentally ill. To be said to have a belief or an ac-
ceptance a person must display a constancy and rationality of the relevant 
dispositions. In the same way, in the kinds of cases I am citing, rather than 
say that a person had differing individual and grouply "beliefs" we ought 
to say instead that she had no beliefs about the matter. She must be either 
confused or terribly ambivalent about the matter at hand. 
Now, even were I to agree that in ordinary language a restricted-scope at-
titude could not properly be called "belief," that would not damage my pres-
ent project. I have introduced restricted-scope belief as shorthand for a list of 
restricted-scope dispositions. The above objection gives no reason to doubt 
that the described dispositions cannot take effect with restricted scopes. If 
this goes against ordinary language, then let me declare that a "restricted 
scope belief" is not a "belief" as we ordinarily understand. I could use the 
term "proto-belief" or some other term instead. The objector, therefore, may 
read "proto-belief" wherever I have written "belief" for restricted scopes. 
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Nonetheless, I am not convinced that my usage does violate our ordi-
nary idea of belief. When we say a person who answers the same ques-
tion inconsistently is confused or cannot make up his mind, we may do 
so only because we do not envision in those circumstances a split set of 
restricted-scope beliefs. After all, it is hard to imagine there being, say, 
one set of dispositions for answering question, Q, the first time, another 
set for answering Q a second time, in the same setting. However, given 
what we know about human behavior and of how the brain works it is 
not difficult to suppose there exists in one human brain one set of dispo-
sitions for grouply contexts and another for individual ones. 
Furthermore, the inclination to suppose "belief" could not have re-
stricted scope may follow not from a conceptual fact about belief, but 
from our desire to categorize people not only as believ-ing p but also 
believ-ers of p. In many cases, we have good practical reasons for want-
ing to do so. This interest, rather than conceptual constraints, might be 
driving our dissatisfaction when asked to recognize a person with split-
scoped attitudes as having a diversity of beliefs. My scheme, on the other 
hand, invites recognizing that at times there may be no further story to 
be told beyond describing the sets of dispositions a person has toward p 
in respectively different kinds of contexts. A person need not always be 
a "believer" simpliciter, but sometimes a repository of a gamut of scoped 
feeling-behavior dispositions. 
Okay. Suppose we agree that scoped beliefs, or proto-beliefs, exist. Do 
not conflicts between at least some scoped dispositions indicate serious 
cognitive malfunction or self-deception? How can a person, for example, 
rationally believe grouply that p while individually doubting p? My an-
swer is that the very having of disparate propositional attitudes across 
scopes no more indicates cognitive malfunction or self-deception than do 
other cognitive clashes in one's noetic makeup. We should all be famil-
iar with having conflicting beliefs, at least until we come to realize the 
conflict. (Once I firmly believed, separately, of course, that on a certain 
Monday evening I would be in quite two different places the entire eve-
ning. Only on the morning of that Monday did the two paths converge 
into cognitive dissonance.) We are often pulled in different directions by 
conflicting evidence and desires. We mayor may not be aware of the con-
flict. Our cognitive lives, group and individual, are too complicated and 
too rich to expect no such conflicts, even serious ones, to occur. Just having 
scoped conflicts is no sin. 
Cognitive malfunction or self-deception could arise depending upon 
what one does when aware of scope conflicts, when one realizes, say, that 
one believes p grouply but doubts it individually, that is, discovers her-
self with the disparate sets of dispositions. In an array of possible cases, 
maintaining the conflicting attitudes would involve neither cognitive mal-
function nor self-deception. For example, suppose I just "find myself" 
believing (or proto-believing) p grouply and also find myself with some 
doubts about p individually.23 Suppose further that I want to believe p 
unrestrictedly, with universal scope, but find myself with serious doubts 
when in non-group contexts. In the meantime, I retain my grouply belief 
and hope that as time goes by my individual belief will change. This can 
be eminently rational. Or suppose I accept p individually but find myself 
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disbelieving p grouply. I might decide to quit that group and cultivate 
cognitive uniformity with my individual acceptance. Or I might decide to 
stay with the group and retain my grouply dispositions because I believe 
it is far more worthy to do so than to leave. For example, I might value 
the wonderful work the group does and find my grouply attitude indis-
pensable for my acting with them. Neither decision need imply cognitive 
malfunction or self-deception. 
Creedal Confession 
As I noted at the start, my point of departure in discussing creedal affir-
mation will be Aquinas, who recorded a rather common-sense view of the 
practice. Aquinas thought "belief" was an "inner act of faith," and confes-
sion of a creed an "outward" act of faith. Aquinas writes, "The outward 
utterance is intended to signify the inward thought,"24 and it is clear from 
the context that Aquinas thought this intention was carried out. Creedal 
affirmations, therefore, are outwardly expressive of what exists inwardly. 
What is the "inward act of faith?"25 For Aquinas, a person can be moved 
to assent to a proposition either by the intellect or by the will. Sometimes, 
an object of the intellect will move the will to assent when that object is not 
sufficient to move the intellect to assent. Now, the propositions of faith, 
for Aquinas, do not move the intellect in this life, because a person cannot 
have a sufficient grasp of them. When the propositions of faith, however, 
draw the will to assent by virtue of the supreme good presented in these 
propositions, a person acquires what Aquinas calls "formed faith." If the 
will is drawn for other reasons, we get just plain faith. Finally, for Aqui-
nas, the certainty of faith is less than for some other propositions a person 
holds when moved by the intellect. 
Aquinas's account of faith includes several features of what I have 
called acceptance. Although scholars differ over to what extent, if any, 
faith is voluntary for Aquinas, he can be read as thinking of faith as a vol-
untary act of a person. In that case, faith is like acceptance, and not belief, 
in allowing its voluntary formation. We have seen also that acceptance can 
arise when a person is not sufficiently moved by the evidence to believe a 
proposition, but sufficiently moved to adopt it as his position. We could 
say then, with Aquinas, that in voluntary acceptance a faith-proposition 
moves the will and not the intellect. Finally, acceptance typically will re-
sult in a less certain stance than outright belief. All told, then, Aquinas's 
faith would best be assimilated to what I have been calling acceptance. 
For Aquinas, faith seems to be a propositional attitude of unrestricted 
scope. This follows from his description of faith as pertaining to a person 
being moved by a proposition, without reference to any context. A faith-
proposition moves a person's will per se. To summarize, then, creedal af-
firmation for Aquinas seems to be an outward expression of an acceptance 
of unrestricted scope. 
I propose three amendments to Aquinas's view of the practice of creedal 
confession. First, unlike Aquinas, we should include in the expressive func-
tion not only acceptance (if acceptance be what Aquinas recognizes) but 
also belief and treating as true. Secondly, creedal confession can express 
propositional attitudes of restricted-scope. Thirdly, while recognizing its 
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expressive function, I want to point to a central non-expressive function of 
creedal confession not supervenient upon its expressive uses, namely that 
of creating an impression that confessors possess an unrestricted attitude, 
indeed belief, to the confessional doctrines. 
With regard to my first amendment, to include belief in creedal confes-
sion would require a theology different from Aquinas,' but people do have 
other thoughts about our concept of God than his. And at least some of 
these would allow us to say that a person believed the creed and not only 
accepted it. I want to go further, though, to include under serious confes-
sion some instances of treating as true religious doctrines without belief or 
acceptance. This would include, especially, Pascalian-type circumstances 
in which a woman treats a dogma as true in an effort to influence her 
psychology so as to acquire a belief in it. She sincerely wants to belief, and 
so, following Pascal's advice, she "takes the holy water," she "has masses 
said," and participates in creedal confessions. 
As to my second amendment, to include restricted scope attitudes in 
serious confessions, I begin by asking you to consider the following two 
sentences in ordinary language: 
(CBl) Catholics believe the sun rises in the morning. 
And 
(CB2) Catholics believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father 
and the Son together. 
(CBl) is equivalent to: 
(CBla) (x)(If x is a Catholic, then x believes-with-unrestricted-scope 
that the sun rises in the morning.) 
However, (CB2), if true, is not equivalent to: 
(CB2a) (x)(If x is a Catholic, then x believes-with-unrestricted-scope 
that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son together.) 
It is not equivalent, because, besides the issue of belief, we should recog-
nize that for some Catholics the belief in the doctrine of double procession 
might have only limited scope. (Neither should (CB2) be taken, with be-
lief-with-unrestricted-scope, as a so-called "generic proposition" such as 
"Cats climb trees," meant to describe what is typically the case for a class 
of objects. It is an open question to what extent Catholics typically believe 
this doctrine with unrestricted scope.) 
A religious group is not simply a collection of people whose religious 
propositional attitudes happen to coincide, the collectivity being the sum 
total of individual beliefs. The strong group-character of religion points to 
the importance of grouply held propositional attitudes among the mem-
bers of a religion. So the possibility exists that a Catholic will have a grou-
ply belief in a dogma, with no corresponding individual belief. Personally, 
when she thinks about it and is allowing herself not to think as a Catholic, 
momentarily standing outside "the circle of faith," she may find herself, 
perhaps without admitting it, without any real opinion on the matter. This 
should be expected especially for dogmas like that of double procession, 
which do not figure much in the daily life of a religious adherent. 
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A person typically acquires and sustains religious "belief" as a mem-
ber of a religious group and may hold a position only as a member of the 
group. One hears things like "We Muslims believe in ... " or "As a Jew I be-
lieve that ... " Some Catholics' positive propositional attitude towards the 
doctrine of "Filioque" or "double procession," would sometimes likely 
be restricted to dispositions, involuntarily acquired, in contexts having 
group-significance for them. When not thinking of themselves as Catho-
lics, they might have no set of tendencies in favor of the doctrine. 
Our conception of religious faith, therefore, should take account of re-
ligious devotees who hold at least some of their propositional attitudes 
only qua members of a doctrinal community. We should even entertain the 
possibility that for some doctrines, like those not so relevant to their daily 
lives, some or many (all?) adherents have only a grouply-attitude toward 
them. 
So I am inclined to understand (CB2), if true, as saying that Catholics 
believe, accept, or treat as true the doctrine of double procession and hold 
these attitudes in either a restricted or unrestricted way. More formally: 
(CB2a) (x)(I£ x is a Catholic, then x believes, accepts, or treats as true in 
a restricted or unrestricted way that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the 
Father and the Son together.) 
Generalizing now, what it means for a person to affirm a creed should 
include: (1) unrestricted belief and acceptance,26 (2) grouply belief and ac-
ceptance, when on the individual-level the dispositions are simply absent or 
accompanied by a level of doubt, and (3) some instances of treating as true. 
Now for my third amendment. Expressing an actual (or hoped for) 
propositional attitude is but one aim of creedal confession. Another pur-
pose, non-expressive all the way down, less likely to be explicitly acknowl-
edged, is creating the impression, among and for religious adherents, that 
religious devotees believe the doctrines, in my technical sense, rather than 
accept them, and that their belief has unrestricted scope, rather than mere-
ly grouply-scope. 
How does creedal confession accomplish this purpose? The impression 
that all adherents hold a belief is not necessarily implied by the semantic 
content of creedal formulations. A creed formulated in terms of "belief" 
can refer either to "belief" or "acceptance" in my technical sense. Also, 
while many creeds are formulated in terms of belief, such as the Nicene 
Creed of Christianity and the semi-creedal Ani Ma'amin of Judaism, oth-
ers are not, including the Islamic shah ada, the Christian Athanasian and 
Westminster creeds, and the semi-creedal Jewish Yigdal recitation.27 In ad-
dition, nothing within the content of creeds distinguishes unrestricted from 
grouply held propositional attitudes. The desired impression of universal-
unrestricted-belief is created, rather, by pragmatic, rather than semantic, 
implications. Here is how it works. 
The confessional context creates an atmosphere apt for activating grou-
ply tendencies in a devotee. A person is put into an atmosphere in which 
she thinks of herself as a member of the doctrinal community. The first 
step in creating the wanted impression, therefore, is to elicit sincere af-
firmations of the creed even from those who believe or accept the creed 
only grouply. 
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Next, there is a pragmatic implication to belief, in my technical sense, 
rather than acceptance, in the following way. Ordinarily, when one simply 
states p, there is no ready pragmatic implication to belief rather than to ac-
ceptance. However, if one regularly declares p with marked seriousness a 
hearer will be entitled to infer that the speaker has a feeling of conviction 
about p, and does not just accept it. One of the ways to get others to think 
you really believe p is to state it to them often enough, in relevant circum-
stances. (This has to be done carefully, however, so as not to appear to 
"protest too much" and produce the opposite effect.) Such circumstances 
include especially where conviction is a desiratum. Creedal confession is 
just such a circumstance. Even if mere acceptance be religiously satisfacto-
ry, devotion of "all of one's heart and all of one's soul," not just acceptance, 
is what religions long for in a devotee. So even if belief is not mandated, 
still conviction-belief is supposed to be valued above all else. We should 
see creedal declarations, therefore, as ritualized acts for creating the prag-
matic implication that a religion's adherents are universally convinced of 
the truth of the creed, believing it and not merely accepting it. Creedal 
affirmation serves the non-expressive function of creating the impression 
of universal belief by confessors. 
The pragmatic implication to unrestricted belief rather than grollply be-
lief exists most clearly for creeds formulated as first person belief declara-
tions of, "I believe." This includes, for example, the semi-creedal Jewish 
ani ma'amin, which begins with the words, "I believe in perfect faith," as 
well as the Nicene Creed that begins with the words, "I believe in one 
God, the Father Almighty." In contrast, recall the committee member with 
only a grouply attitude toward the committee's call for increased alloca-
tions to higher education. Individually, he opposed it or abstained. Such 
a person need not, and ordinarily would not, proclaim, "I believe the al-
location should be increased." He will simply support an increase in the 
allocation, and refer to the committee's "belief" to that effect. Also, a Tully 
River native, with a grouply attitude toward magical pregnancy, did not 
state that he or she believed in magical conception. They simply asserted 
magical conception to be a fact. When dealing with first-person belief for-
mulations of a creed, a pragmatic implication is that the devotee wishes 
to draw attention to his or her holding the doctrine in an unrestricted way, 
that she or he is not holding it just grouply. 
The pragmatic implication to an unrestricted propositional attitude ap-
plies, though with somewhat less force, to creedal affirmations not for-
mulated as first-person belief, such as the Jewish yigdal prayer. The impli-
cation would be created by the repeated proclamation of the creed. The 
implication is yet weaker, however, for creeds formulated in first person 
plural, such as the Chalcedonian creed opening with, "Following, then, 
the holy fathers, we unite in teaching all men to confess the one and only 
Son, our Lord Jesus Christ." 
There is a paradoxical air about the whole affair of pragmatically im-
plying unrestricted-belief in creedal doctrines. Since the confessors of the 
creed know it to be a ritualized, indeed mandated affair, the pragmatic 
implication takes place within a consciousness that the confession may be 
"staged," precisely for the purpose of creating an impression that might 
very well be false. Although employed for a good and noble purpose, 
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creedal confession, therefore, may involve institutional bad faith or self-
deception, and invites analysis similar to those offered for the paradox of 
individual self-deception.28 
To conclude, my proposal is that the ritualized performance of creedal 
confession creates an atmosphere for thinking that all adherents believe, 
and unrestrictedly so, in the creed. And I may add, the expressivist view 
itself might be a further part of that very strategy. By taking an expressiv-
ist position on creedal confession one might want, consciously or not, to 
contribute further to the impression that when confessing, people mean 
exactly what they seem to be saying. 
Advanced religions, at their best, teach that the individual human con-
dition is in need of radical transformation and offer life-embracing pro-
grams for fostering their respective visions of that transformation. These 
programs employ various strategies for strengthening the faith for this 
end and for other purposes. One of these educational strategies is the cre-
ation of group impressions, true or false, as in creedal confessions.29 
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